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ABSTRACT
Privacy law in the United States has not kept pace with the
realities of technological development, nor the growing reliance
on the Internet of Things (IoT). As of now, the law has not
adequately secured the “smart” home from intrusion by the state,
and the Supreme Court further eroded digital privacy by
conflating the common law concepts of trespass and exclusion in
United States v. Jones. This article argues that the Court must
correct this misstep by explicitly recognizing the method by which
the Founding Fathers sought to “secure” houses and effects
under the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the Court must reject its
overly narrow trespass approach in lieu of the more appropriate
right to exclude. This will better account for twenty-first century
surveillance capabilities and properly constrain the state.
Moreover, an exclusion framework will bolster the reasonable
expectation of digital privacy by presuming an objective
unreasonableness in any warrantless penetration by the state into
the smart home.

INTRODUCTION
During Apple’s Macworld keynote in January 2007, Steve Jobs
unveiled “an iPod, a phone, and an Internet communicator,” promising:
“This will change everything.”1 Indeed, as the paragon of so-called
‘smart’ technology, the iPhone has changed entire industries, and in short
order, introduced society at-large to an interconnected world.2 This
†
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1
Lisa Eadicicco, Watch Steve Jobs Unveil the First iPhone 10 Years Ago Today,
TIME (Jan. 9, 2017), http://time.com/4628515/steve-jobs-iphone-launch-keynote2007/.
2
See SAMUEL GREENGARD, THE INTERNET OF THINGS xii (2016) (noting that the
introduction of the iPhone on the market, and its impact on the market, was a
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concept is increasingly – and quite literally – being brought home.3
Network- and inter-connected devices, also referred to as the Internet of
Things (“IoT”), are creating a “nervous system” within what is
traditionally one of the most private of spaces: the home. Access “the
house’s digital hub and you can actually spy on [its] chattering stuff.”4
Privacy law in the United States has not adequately kept pace with
these technological developments, and its failure to recognize the unique
character of digital information is undermining the security of the home
against government intrusion. With the rejuvenation of a trespass-based
conception of the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Jones,5 the
Supreme Court eroded digital privacy by relying on a legal concept better
suited to the physical context.6 Such reliance leads to perverse results. For
example, one district court judge equated the FBI gaining remote access
to a private computer by exploiting digital vulnerabilities (i.e., hacking) to
an officer peering through a gap in an apartment’s window blinds, and
therefore not requiring a warrant.7 By relying on this inappropriate
analogy, the judge sanctioned full, unrestricted access to the data stored
on a private computer without any showing of probable cause.
As of now, the legal landscape is not equipped to adequately
protect against digital abuses by the state. Though a majority of the sitting
members of the Supreme Court has signaled a willingness to accommodate
“crystalizing event” in the development of smart objects); cf. Planet of the
Phones, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21645180-smartphone-ubiquitous-addictive-and-transformative-planetphones (noting that the “iPhone exemplifies the early 21st century’s defining
technology,” its transformative power derived from its “size and connectivity”).
3
See There’s No Place Like [a Connected] Home, MCKINSEY & CO.,
http://www.mckinsey.com/spContent/connected_homes/index.html (last visited
Apr. 24, 2017) (demonstrating a thirty-one percent compound annual growth rate
of connected homes from 2015 through 2017); see also Eric Griffith & Alex
Colon, The Best Smart Home Devices of 2018, PC MAG (Dec. 1, 2017, 11:51
AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2410889,00.asp.
4
Bill Wasik, In the Programmable World, All Our Objects Will Act as One,
WIRED (May 14, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-ofthings-2/; see generally, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing
Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2010)
(detailing the “ideal of the inviolate home” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
as a sphere afforded particular constitutional protection).
5
565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding the attachment and subsequent use of a tracking
device on a vehicle constitutes a trespassory interference with an “effect,” and is
therefore a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
6
Id. at 404 (“It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.”).
7
United States v. Matish, 193 F.Supp. 3d 585, 615 (E.D. Va. June 23, 2016).
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technological evolution into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court
has yet to correct its misstep in Jones.8 It must do so.
As noted in Part I of this paper, smart devices are prolific, and they
create vulnerabilities in the security of the home. This section presents the
Court’s evolution on privacy protections from a property- to personhoodbased paradigm. Thereafter, Part II clarifies that the Fourth Amendment
has historically been linked to privacy rights as a means of articulating the
security of, among other things, “houses . . . and effects”9 from
government intrusion. Part II then argues that a privacy-protective
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment should be based on exclusion,
rather than trespass. Thus, this paper concludes that the Court must reject
Jones’ overly-narrow trespass approach, problematic for the non-physical
intrusion at issue with IoT, in lieu of the more appropriate right to exclude.
An exclusion-based framework will better account for twenty-first century
technological surveillance techniques. Doing so will fulfill the guarantees
of the Fourth Amendment and ensure that the government may not
unreasonably intrude upon digital privacy.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Internet of Things Comes Home
Many associate smart devices with objects like Amazon’s Echo,
the speaker that connects users to its smart assistant, Alexa.10 Yet beyond
this, smart objects in the home are vast and varied. From the mundane to
the extremely personal, from juicers to condoms,11 the market share for
8

See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts noted that the search of a smartphone, with its vast quantity
of information, “bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search
considered” in prior Fourth Amendment cases); Jones, 565 U.S. at 417
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he same technological advances that have made
possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by
shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 419
(Alito, J., concurring) (arguing for a review of reasonable expectations of privacy
based on new surveillance capabilities, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan).
9
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10
See Alexa Voice Service, AMAZON, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-voiceservice (last visited Dec. 13, 2017); Dan Eavon, What is Alexa? It’s Amazon’s
New Virtual Assistant, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sept. 7, 2017, 1:03 PM),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/what-is-amazons-alexa-and-what-can-itdo/.
11
See Jeff Dunn, 17 Ridiculous ‘Smart’ Gadgets that Really Exist, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 14, 2017, 1:44 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/weirdest-smartgadgets-internet-of-things-smart-home-2017-3/#hidrate-spark-2; Griffith &
Colon, supra note 3.
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smart objects is growing.12 To be sure, “connected devices are disrupting
every nook of the home.”13 But what are the “things” in the IoT,14 and
what vulnerabilities are created by their proliferation?
Stated simply, IoT refers to a web of identifiable devices—the
things—which are capable of automatically communicating data about the
device to a system able to read and interpret that information.15 Sensors
are embedded in otherwise “dumb” objects to sense the environment
around them and communicate that information onward.16 Not all smart
devices are connected to the Internet in the strictest sense, though they may
use the same Internet Protocol; indeed, some “smart” objects are so
categorized because they contain a simple sensor like a radio frequency
identification (“RFID”) chip that “talks” to some central system.17

12

See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3 (detailing the current market for smartdevices objects, current obstacles, and potential for growth); see also Peter M.
Lefkowitz, Making Sense of the Internet of Things, 59 BOS. B.J. 23, 23 (Fall 2015)
(“[IoT] will have an annual economic impact of between $4 trillion and $11
trillion by 2025.”).
13
MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3 (listing “home intelligence, energy efficiency,
entertainment, wellness, access control, home safety, home comfort, daily tasks,
[and] connectivity”).
14
To succinctly articulate the privacy issues inherent with IoT devices, this
paper’s scope is limited to smart objects inside the home. Under the current
doctrinal construction of the Fourth Amendment, the location of activity
complicates the analysis. See generally Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 45
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3 (2016). For instance, more nuance is needed
for devices that are carried by a person both inside and outside the home (i.e.,
FitBit) and for objects that are just as likely to be in a home as in a location where
the presumption of privacy has been found to be reduced (i.e., smart televisions
in schools). See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)
(holding a diminished expectation of privacy in schools). While the character of
the data that is collected by such devices is similar in kind to that collected in the
home—and is therefore also worthy of privacy protections argued for in this
paper—for rhetorical clarity, the smart devices at issue here are limited to those
found within a home.
15
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 823–24 (2016) (“Some definitions
of IoT would require a higher level of interoperability to qualify as being part of
the IoT.”).
16
Michael Chui, et al., The Internet of Things, MCKINSEY Q. (Mar. 2010),
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/the-internet-ofthings.
17
See id.; INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD,
FED. TRADE COMM. 5 (Jan. 2015) [Hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissionstaff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-
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The point of all IoT devices, however, is to gather information:
“[T]hese networks churn out huge volumes of data that flow to computers
for analysis . . . . They become tools for understanding complexity and
responding to it swiftly.”18 Fundamentally, the IoT is a system of
gathering large quantities of information that amount to private
surveillance of the user’s activities, preferences, and habits in the home.19
This information is then “leveraged” to optimize the function of the given
object.20 Though primitive smart objects were initially designed to
improve manufacturing,21 today “these connected devices . . . collect,
transmit, store, and potentially share vast amounts of [highly personal]
consumer data.”22 This information is granular in detail and almost
incomprehensibly large in quantity.23
To the extent that “internet connectivity makes good objects
great,” it appears that “a chip-centric mentality has taken over,” without
necessarily accounting for the security of the home network.24 Not all
smart objects are designed with the same level of intelligence, or with the
privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf (discussing the continued ambiguity in IoT’s
definition); cf. Matt Burgess, What is the Internet of Things?, WIRED Explains,
WIRED UK (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/internet-of-thingswhat-is-explained-iot (distinguishing from “simple sensors” to “smartphones and
wearables”).
18
Chui, et al., supra note 16; see Patrick McFadin, Internet of Things: Where Does
the Data Go?, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2015/03/internet-thingsdata-go/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
19
Ferguson, supra note 15, at 818–19; see Jamie Lee Williams, Privacy in the
Age of the Internet of Things, 41 HUM. RTS. 14, 15 (2016) (quoting the head of
regulatory affairs at Siemens Metering Systems, saying “we can infer how many
people are in the house, what they do, whether they’re upstairs, downstairs, do
you have a dog, when do you habitually get up, when did you get up this morning,
when do you have a shower: masses of private data”).
20
Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things is Far Bigger than Anyone Realizes,
WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/
(last visited Apr. 25, 2017).
21
Robin Kester, Demystifying the Internet of Things: Industry Impact,
Standardization Problems, and Legal Considerations, 8 ELON L. REV. 205, 206
(2016).
22
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 2.
23
See Alex Wall, Privacy and the Internet of Things: Everything Around You is
Collecting your Private Data, RADAR (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.radar
first.com/blog/privacy-and-the-internet-of-things (“By 2020, the Internet of
Things will comprise no less than 50 billion devices and 212 billion sensors,
generating 44 zettabytes of information. A zettabyte is 10 21 bytes or
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.”).
24
Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable
Things, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 581, 583 (2016).
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long-term functionality of the device in mind; think, for instance, about
the average lifespan of a refrigerator versus a shampoo bottle, both of
which are now connected “things.”25 A smart device only functions as
such so long as its software is up-to-date.26 On one hand, some of these
devices may be used in the home well beyond the point where the
manufacturer—now a service provider—continues to patch critical
vulnerabilities.27 Conversely, some devices are designed to be quickly
disposed of, so they are not serviced at all due to the limited capacity of
the object’s bandwidth or RFID.28 Yet, all software is a potential access
point, a vector through which the security of a network may be
compromised.29
Left unchecked, smart objects potentially can be transformed into
tools of invasive surveillance by the state.30 Malicious (i.e., black hat)
hackers already have proven that IoT devices are prime targets for
infiltration:31 anecdotal stories proliferate, with hackers yelling at children
through digital baby monitors32 and experiments proving the
“inevitability” of an unsecured toaster being breached once connected to

Id. at 586–87 (“Security researcher Brian Krebs notes that poorly configured
default settings for IoT devices are a security nightmare. This is particularly true
for devices that are costly to change, like many disposable ad cheap IoT
devices.”).
26
Id. at 583–84 (noting that software can crash suddenly and needs updates and
upgrades to maintain its connectivity).
27
See id. at 588–89 (“The typical lifetime of software is around 2 years. But the
estimated lifetime of some objects now connected to the Internet is often around
10 years. Just think about how long coffee pots and refrigerators last.”).
28
Id. at 586.
29
See e.g., Nick Ismail, The Internet of Things: The security Crisis of 2018?, INFO.
AGE (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.information-age.com/internet-things-securitycrisis-123470475/ (“The influx of additional entry points… plus a current lack of
security standards for IoT devices, means there is a gaping hole in the perimeter
of any home… that has installed IoT devices.”); see also Hartzog & Selinger,
supra note 24, at 588 (noting that “every new IoT connection brings new risks”).
30
Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies,
Interoperability, and Threats to Privacy and Security, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
997, 1013 (2016) (comparing the potential for invasive surveillance of private
spheres via IoT to that of CCTV in public).
31
Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What are White Hat, Gray Hat, and Black Hat
Hackers?, WIRED (Apr. 13, 2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/
hacker-lexicon-white-hat-gray-hat-black-hat-hackers (“Black hats are criminals.
They use their prowess to find or develop software holes and attack methods.”).
32
Kashmir Hill, The Half-Baked Security of Our ‘Internet of Things’, FORBES
(May 27, 2014, 2:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/05/27/
article-may-scare-you-away-from-internet-of-things/.
25
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the Internet.33 Governments are undeniably able, and they in fact are
engaged in hacking;34 indeed, Congress has made it easier for U.S. law
enforcement to remotely access computing devices for investigatory
purposes.35 Like the black hats above, law enforcement agencies are
working to develop, and in some cases already possess, the capabilities to
access not only traditional computing devices but also smart objects within
the home.36 To wit, the depth and scope of knowledge available to the
government, should it seek to gain access to the smart-home’s “nervous
system,” is exactly the type of intrusion the Fourth Amendment was
designed to secure against.37

B. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment declares inviolate “the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”38 It protects
against unreasonable government intrusions by establishing a certain right
to privacy enforceable by the individual “as against the world.”39 Yet, the
Amendment is not clear as to exactly how this is manifested. Supreme
Court jurisprudence on this point has vacillated between a purely property
33

Andrew McGill, The Inevitability of Being Hacked, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 28,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/we-built-a-fakeweb-toaster-and-it-was-hacked-in-an-hour/505571/.
34
Eva Galperin, The Year in Government Hacking: 2016 in Review, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/12/yeargovernment-hacking.
35
See FED. R. CIV. P. 41; Supreme Court Approves Change to Rule 41 Search and
Seizure Warrants for Electronic Property, THE NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF (Apr. 29,
2016), http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/supreme-courts-approves-change-torule-41-search-and-seizure-warrants-for-electronic-property/; Kate Tummarello,
The Fight Over Government Hacking Continues, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec.
6, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/12/fight-over-government-hack
ing-continues; see also Devin M. Adams, The 2016 Amendments to Criminal Rule
41: National Search Warrants to Seize Cyberspace, ‘Particularly’ Speaking, 51
U. RICH. L. REV. 272 (2017) (arguing for the propriety of the 2016 Amendments
to Rule 41).
36
See Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed, WIKILEAKS, https://wiki
leaks.org/ciav7p1/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); see also David Choi, WikiLeaks
Publishes More Secret CIA Tools After the US Threatens Criminal Charges, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/wikileaks-cia-hackingtools-samsung-weeping-angel-2017-4 (detailing the “Weeping Angel” tool that
activates Samsung televisions’ built-in microphones for surveillance purposes).
37
See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 820 (explaining that a “data-rich environment
creates a wider mosaic of life patterns,” allowing police to virtually and constantly
surveil).
38
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
39
See id.; Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 213. (Dec. 15, 1890).
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(in rem) conception,40 to one based on expectations of privacy (in
personam),41 to a hybrid of the two.42 As a result, the current Fourth
Amendment framework imperils the security of digital information
emanating from the home; it fails to accommodate the scope of the right
the framers intended to protect and ignores how they sought to do so.
The Amendment does not protect privacy as such. Rather, it
identifies and guarantees enumerated property interests, thus buttressing a
sphere within which the intimacies of life may be protected.43 Until the
mid-twentieth century, property law dominated the Court’s jurisprudence
and increasingly obscured the underlying privacy interest.44 For instance,
the Court’s 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States45 solidified the
subordinate relationship of privacy to property, where intrusion upon the
latter established the harm to the former. “Every invasion of private
property,” the Boyd Court declared, “be it ever so minute, is a trespass.”46
Boyd subsumed privacy under the harm to property, thus triggering a
constitutionally protected interest.47 The Boyd Court was also at pains to
point out that “the eye cannot by the [common law] be guilty of a
40

See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 493 (1928) (holding search and
seizure are dependent upon physical interference with tangible effects).
41
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A]
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy,” particularly in the home, and “the
invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is . . .
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant”); see also Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (reaffirming the reasonable expectation
of privacy as the basis of Fourth Amendment protections).
42
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2011) (reasserting trespass as a
controlling factor in defining an unreasonable search, separate and complimentary
to the Katz-based reasonable expectation of privacy).
43
See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth
Amendment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 622–
23 (2008) (labeling “privacy” as the underlying interest protected through the
security of property); see also William Clark, Note, Protecting the Privacies of
Digital Life: Riley v. California, The Fourth Amendment’s Particularity
Requirement, and Search Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 1981, 1988 (2015) (quoting Boyd, and detailing “privacies” as the intimate
details of a person’s life).
44
See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 312 (1998) (starting from
the late eighteenth century, with Boyd, through the latter half of the twentieth
century “the Supreme Court defined the interest secured by the Fourth
Amendment largely in terms of property rights”).
45
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
46
Id. at 627.
47
See id. at 628 (noting that a violation of the “secret nature of [private papers]
will be an aggravation of the trespass”).
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trespass.”48 Pursuant to this theory, observation alone is insufficient;
rather, some physical interference with the property named in the
Amendment is necessary before privacy may be infringed.
This fealty to property is increasingly at odds with individual
privacy as society develops its technological savvy. One of the earliest
instances of this growing disconnect came in 1928, when the Court
decided Olmstead v. United States.49
That case concerned the
admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless wiretap,
which in turn proved a criminal bootleg conspiracy.50 The Olmstead Court
focused on where the wiretapping occurred, noting that it was done
“without trespass upon any property of the defendants” since the wires
were physically located in public spaces.51 As such, the Court concluded
that law enforcement’s eavesdropping on telecommunications did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because no property interest was
infringed.52 Consequently, the Court failed to protect the privacy of
information that originated, at least partially, from within the home, an
otherwise protected space within the plain text of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court had difficulty identifying any privacy right separate from the
tangible objects listed in the Amendment.53 It rejected outright the notion
that protection could extend to “telephone wires, reaching to the whole
world,” since they were not within any defendant’s house or otherwise
directly associated with their private property.54
With Silverman v. United States,55 decided in 1961, the Court
declined to revisit its Olmstead logic to account for technological
advancements in the intervening years. There, when confronted with the
use of a “spike mike,” the Court declined to go beyond the trespass
analysis.56 Ignoring any conception of privacy separate from an invasion
of property, the Court declared “a fair reading of the record in this case
shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an
unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the
48

Id. at 628.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
50
Id. at 455.
51
Id. at 457.
52
Id. at 466 (“We think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not
amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
53
Id. at 464 (“The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material
things.”).
54
Id. at 465.
55
365 U.S. 505 (1961).
56
Id. at 506 (clarifying that “[t]he instrument in question was a microphone with
a spike about a foot long attached to it,” which was inserted through a vacant room
into an adjoining row house where it made contact with heating duct that
amplified the mic’s capabilities).
49
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petitioners.”57 While the Court found that Silverman’s rights had been
violated, it did so based on the state’s intrusion into the building’s heating
duct, not on any notion of personal privacy owed to Silverman, distinct
from his property interest.58
This trespass-dependent equation broke down completely in 1967
as the Court shifted from an in rem, property-based right to an in
personam, privacy-based paradigm.59 In Katz v. United States,60 the Court
found that the Fourth Amendment’s protections “cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”61
For the first time, the Court rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment
was limited to “a given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, [as] ‘constitutionally
protected.’”62 Rather, the rights ensured by the Amendment vest in
“people, not places.”63 While the Court’s in personam reasoning was a
monumental shift, the enduring legacy of Katz comes from Justice
Harlan’s famous concurrence. Following Katz, Fourth Amendment
privacy protections are based upon reasonableness: where a subjective
expectation of privacy exhibited by the individual is found objectively
reasonable by society.64
Notably, the Court did not reject the notion that particular
locations are secured as such, by virtue of their character.65 Rather, it
uncoupled trespass as a pre-requisite to privacy intrusions, allowing the
right to vest directly in the individual.66 Certain areas are still very much
at the fore of the Court’s thinking when evaluating constitutional
57

Id.
Id. at 509 (“Eavesdropping accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion
is beyond the pale.”).
59
Jace C. Gatewood, The Evolution of the Right to Exclude – More than a
Property Right, a Privacy Right, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 447, 457–58 (2014).
60
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61
Id. at 353.
62
Id. at 352.
63
Id.
64
See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding a twofold requirement to
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy); see also United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 408 (2012) (reaffirming the expectation of privacy standard); Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001) (basing its analysis upon the two-part
reasonableness standard).
65
See, e.g., Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (quoting Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (“[The] Amendment indicates with some
precision the places and things encompassed by its protections. . . . ‘The
distinction between [open fields] and the house is as old as the common law.’”).
66
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (noting that to read the Fourth Amendment
exclusively through the lens of a property-based right “is to ignore the vital role”
that pervasive technologies play in modern life).
58
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protection—the home being chief among them, as an expressly protected
object under the Amendment.67
Following Katz, the Fourth Amendment secures two aspects of
privacy, in equal measure. First, in personam, reasonable expectations of
privacy are protected. Second, certain locales are singled out for specific
protection. The Court, however, continues to grapple with the issue of
technological invasions of the home.68 In deciding these cases, the Court
has relied both on the constitutional sanctity of the home and on
expectations of privacy, but it has yet to properly balance digital privacy
interests.
In Kyllo v. United States,69 in 2001, the Court addressed “[the]
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”70 The
case concerned the warrantless use of thermal imaging of Danny Lee
Kyllo’s home by law enforcement agents, who deployed a heat-sensing
device to detect the presence of high-intensity lamps for growing
marijuana indoors.71 The scan, conducted from across the street, identified
a single room that was relatively hotter, thus tending to prove the presence
of such lamps.72 In 1992, when the scan was completed, mobile thermal
technology of the kind used against the Kyllo residence was not in
widespread use, which factored heavily in the decision by the Court.73
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declared that “obtaining by senseenhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search—at least where
. . . the technology in question is not in general public use.”74 The Kyllo
Court was keen to maintain flexibility in its interpretation of the Fourth

67

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting houses directly); see also Stern, supra
note 4, at 913 (“In a jurisprudence focused on privacy versus publicity, the home
is the quintessential private space.”).
68
Cf. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527
(2017) (surveying privacy jurisprudence relating to electronic surveillance in
public, with reflections of the law relating to the home).
69
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
70
Id. at 34 (addressing how much technological enhancement is too much to
survive constitutional scrutiny).
71
Id. at 30.
72
Id.
73
See id. at 30, 40.
74
Id. at 34 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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Amendment to preserve protection against “technology that could discern
all human activity in the home.”75
In 2012, however, by declaring that trespass was again
determinative in United States v. Jones, the Court upended the trajectory
of its Fourth Amendment decisions, which theretofore had progressed
towards a more digital privacy-protective framework.76 In doing so, it
introduced a hybrid in rem/in personam interpretation of the Amendment.
Jones concerned the pervasive surveillance of a vehicle—an “effect”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment77—through the attachment
of a GPS tracker without a valid warrant.78 Despite the Court’s exclusive
reliance on expectations of privacy since Katz in 1967, Justice Scalia,
again writing for the majority, reiterated that the Court’s privacy
jurisprudence “embod[ies] a particular concern for government
trespass.”79 He reasoned that, at a minimum, the Amendment’s guarantee
against unreasonable searches must replicate “the degree of protection it
afforded when it was adopted.”80 Thus, he found that law enforcement
had trespassed against Jones’ constitutionally protected “effect;” as such,
no further privacy analysis was necessary.81 As a result, per Justice Alito’s
concurrence, the majority opinion relies on “18th-century tort law” to
address a “21st-century surveillance technique.”82 The Court assures,
however, that had no interference with property occurred, the reasonable
expectation of privacy would control.83
By re-animating trespass as a legitimate basis for Fourth
Amendment protections, the Jones Court recalled into existence the
historic requirement for “a physical intrusion . . . by the government on
property belonging to another,”84 as in the Boyd-Olmstead-Silverman line
75

Id. at 35–36 (indicating in dicta that such surveillance may have constitutional
implications).
76
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“Jones’ Fourth
Amendment Rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”).
77
See Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 170, 177 n.7 (1984) (noting that the
framers would label personal, rather than real property as an “effect”); Ferguson,
supra note 15, at 828 (noting “effects” within the meaning of the amendment
generally refers to goods, moveable objects, or possessions: an individual’s
personal property).
78
Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (defining a vehicle as a Fourth Amendment effect, and
the attachment thereto of a GPS tracking device to be a trespassory search).
79
Id. at 406.
80
Id. at 411.
81
Id. at 412–13.
82
Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring).
83
Id. at 411 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”) (emphasis removed).
84
Gatewood, supra note 59, at 454.
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of cases. Indeed, trespass at common law has a specific meaning: as
narrowly defined by Sir William Blackstone, trespass “signifie[d] no more
than an entry on another man’s ground without a lawful authority, and
doing some damage, however inconsiderable.”85 In turning to this
particular conception of property rights at common law, the Jones Court
side-stepped another central property right, arguably the sine qua non: the
right to exclude.86 Per Blackstone, property is “that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”87
Indeed, Jones leaves open several lingering questions about how
the Fourth Amendment protects and secures digital privacy in the age of
the IoT. The Court’s evolution from its exclusive dependence in Boyd,
Olmstead, and Silverman on in rem, and specifically trespassory, harm,
gave way to a right vested directly in the person.88 The reasonable
expectation of privacy recognized for the first time the tangible and
intangible aspects of the privacy right secured by the Fourth Amendment,
by vesting in personam. Katz therefore distinguished the personhood and
property form of the right, while continuing to recognize certain specific
locations whose protection remains heightened.89 Kyllo is a prime
example where the in rem right yielded to the in personam, with the Court
finding it unreasonable to expect certain surveillance technologies being
deployed against a home.90 Kyllo left open the question of reasonable
expectations regarding commonly used technologies,91 but Jones radically
altered the trajectory of the Court’s jurisprudence by recalling into force
the trespass analysis—abandoned a half-century before—as the
controlling framework.92 This last turn in the Court’s jurisprudence leaves
digital privacy open to abuse by the state, where strict interpretations of

85

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3, at 209
(photo. Reprint, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1766).
86
See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 730 (1998) (explaining the logical and historical primacy of the right to
exclude in property law).
87
Id. at 734 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 2, at 2 (photo. Reprint, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1766).
88
See Gatewood, supra note 59 at 457–58 (discussing the evolution from a
property-based to a privacy-based paradigm).
89
Id. at 461.
90
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 34 (2001).
91
Cf. id. (basing its holding on the lack of common usage).
92
See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 832 (concluding that, among other things, Jones
resurrected the “long-dormant” trespass theory of the amendment).
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property rights overwhelm reasonable expectations of privacy, or where
courts are unwilling to find an objective expectation of reasonableness.93

II. ANALYSIS
New technologies fundamentally alter society.94 Still, the
durability of constitutional protections depends upon the law
accommodating how people interact with these new technologies and how
law enforcement may legitimately utilize the benefits of technological
development.95 The essence of the Fourth Amendment, however, is to
restrain unwarranted government action against the individual: it is the
expression of the framers’ intent to secure the American people from
intrusion by the state, in the form of unreasonable search and seizure.96
Without a proper recognition by the Court of how the Fourth Amendment
protects digital privacy, virtual access by law enforcement threatens the
security of citizens in their houses and digital effects.97 Thus, to ensure
privacy in the face of evolving technology, it is once again “necessary
. . . to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection.”98
In a world dominated by smart devices, the right to exclude—not
trespass—is the better analytical framework. As clarified below, the use
of property rights by the framers was not so literal; it was a method of
articulating privacy rights “secured” under the Fourth Amendment.
Indeed, the state is precluded from exploiting digital vulnerabilities in the
home unless it overcomes the burdens imposed on it by the Fourth
Amendment to prove reasonableness.99 Yet, the analysis (re)instituted by
Jones in 2012 does not adequately account for the data-rich environment
created by smart devices in the home, or the wide-ranging surveillance

93

Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 414, 425–26 (2012) (Sotomayor and Alito,
JJ., concurring) (noting lingering issues unaddressed by the purely trespass theory
of the majority).
94
See, e.g., Jim Luce, The Impact of Cell Phones on Psychology, Community,
Culture, Arts and Economics, Huffington Post (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-luce/the-impact-of-cellphones_b_508011.html (discussing smart phones’ impact on the quality of
people’s lives).
95
Cf. Gatewood, supra note 59, at 457–58 (recognizing action by the Court in
response to developing technologies to ensure proper privacy protections in its
adoption of the Katz standard).
96
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
97
See U.S. Const. amend IV; Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the
Central Value Protected by the Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on
Unreasonable Searches, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 143, 161 (2015).
98
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 193.
99
See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 822
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opportunities they afford to law enforcement.100 Rather, the Court should
build on its decision in Kyllo to strengthen the in personam expectation of
privacy by making explicit its reliance on exclusion as a means of
perfecting the Fourth Amendment’s “security.”101 Doing so will properly
constrain the state’s ability to gain access to the digital home.

A. The Fourth Amendment is a Means of “Securing” Privacy
The founding fathers were pragmatic in their use of property rights
at common law to express the scope of the Fourth Amendment, but their
intent to protect a right to privacy vested in the person is clear by the term
used to conserve such rights: namely, to “secure.” In crafting the Fourth
Amendment, the framers were determined to guarantee safeguards that
would prohibit “invasions of the home and [thereby, to secure] privacy of
the citizens.”102 In essence, resistance to unreasonable search and seizure
was the codification of the maxim: “a man’s house [is] his castle . . . not
to be invaded by any general authority.”103 Thus, the Amendment’s
drafters sought to protect “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies
of life” through property law as a means of guaranteeing that sphere of
protection.104
Property law is “deployed as a means of operationalizing privacy,
not replacing it.”105 The enumeration of certain tangible objects—persons,
houses, papers, and effects—was meant to cover the breadth of personal
interests guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.106 Rather than elevate
tortious trespass by the government to the level of constitutional
protection, these property rights articulate the scope of the privacy right.107
As such, these objects represent the sphere within which “the privacies of
life” are protected.

100

See id. at 818–19; see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (presenting the “mosaic theory” whereby largescale, aggregated data
reveals the intimacies of life).
101
See section II.c infra (arguing for the replacement of trespass with exclusion
as a means of establishing a reasonable expectation of digital privacy).
102
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389–390 (1914); see Clancy, supra note
44 at 310.
103
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390.
104
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 603 (referencing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State
Trials 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765) as evidence of the founding fathers’
purpose in crafting the Fourth Amendment).
105
Slobogin, supra note 97, at 156.
106
Id.; see also Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
107
See Bascuas, supra note 43, at 622.
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Thus, property is the means to explain the scope of the
constitutional privacy right,108 and security is the action effectuating the
Fourth Amendment’s purpose.109 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment speaks
explicitly of a right to be “secure” in the enumerated property interests.110
For the framers, “security” from unreasonable intrusion referred to the
right to exclude; to wit, it is the essential attribute of the action guaranteed
by the Amendment.111 “Without the ability to exclude, a person has no
security. With the ability to exclude, a person has all the Fourth
Amendment promises: protection against unjustified intrusions by the
government.”112
This right to exclude extends to all private property, both real and
personal, guaranteed through the Fourth Amendment’s enumeration of
tangible objects—the text of the Amendment does not draw hierarchies
between houses and effects. As Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis noted
in their seminal work on the right to privacy, “the term ‘property’ has
grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as
tangible.”113 As such, the ability to exclude proscribes all unreasonable
intrusion by the state, tangible and intangible.114
The right to exclude is fundamental to property at common law—
related, but distinct from the narrower trespass.115 The Fourth Amendment
is not concerned with tortious trespass, as Justice Scalia’s opinion in Jones
asserts. Rather, the Amendment excludes the government from specific
objects as a means of articulating the breadth of a constitutional right to
privacy. This distinction is necessary in a modern context where virtual
intrusion by law enforcement threatens the security of the smart home.
“Security” through exclusion guarantees the inviolability of both the
tangible and intangible effects protected by the Fourth Amendment and
therefore is the most appropriate framework given the advent of IoT.116

Id. at 622–23 (“‘Property’ for Fourth Amendment purposes needs to be
interpreted to further the underlying purpose of protecting privacy.”).
109
See generally, Clancy, supra note 44 (articulating security as the function of
the Fourth Amendment).
110
See U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Ferguson, supra note 15, at 861.
111
See Clancy, supra note 44, at 308.
112
Id. at 308–09.
113
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 193.
114
See Clancy, supra note 44, at 367–68 (“That was the essential lesson of Katz.”).
115
Gatewood, supra note 59, at 452.
116
See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 861 (indicating that “security” is the best
framework towards the protection of digital effects).
108
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B. Reliance on Trespass is Inappropriate in a “Smart” World
The concern expressed by the Court in Kyllo persists: technology
threatens to shrink the realm of privacy protections, now because of
ambiguity in the law regarding smart objects.117 Yet, the Fourth
Amendment must protect at least the scope of rights it guaranteed at its
passage: namely, security of privacy interests.118 Justice Scalia’s pivot
back to trespass in Jones presents a problematic and overly restrictive
conception of the Amendment. As it has historically, property plays a
constructive role as a means of articulating what is secured by the Fourth
Amendment.119 Yet, Jones’ literalism misconstrues the method by which
the framers sought to guarantee the underlying privacy right.120 The turn
to trespass by the Jones Court is too dependent upon the physical to
survive modern dependence on smart technologies, and it fails to properly
account for the framers’ methodology to guarantee the “[digital] privacies
of [twenty-first century] life.”121
In his majority opinion in Jones, Justice Scalia acknowledges the
“close connection to property” reflected in the text of the Fourth
Amendment.122 Privacy jurisprudence, he was careful to reiterate, was tied
to property at common law until Katz.123 Yet, “the Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test.”124 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that the
corpus of Fourth Amendment law post-Katz remains linked to trespass,
though not exclusively, as with the purely in-rem decisions of the Court
prior to 1967.125
The glaring issue with Justice Scalia’s recalling of trespass to the
fore of privacy law is its false equivalence between exclusion and trespass.
117

See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting the limitation on hits finding of
unreasonableness).
118
Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).
119
Carrie Leonetti, A Grand Compromise for the Fourth Amendment, 12 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 1, 21 (2016) (“A new doctrine of Fourth Amendment property could
serve as a unifying principle to rationalize and expand the Amendment’s privacy
protections.”).
120
See Bascuas, supra note 43, at 622–23 (creating a property interest is “the law’s
vehicle for recognizing and affording privacy” as a pragmatic approach towards
guaranteeing its protection).
121
See Leonetti, supra note 119, at 21 (2016) (“High-tech invasions of privacy
inflict serious harms that demand a more appropriate legal remedy than
[reasonableness].”).
122
Jones, 565 U.S. at 405.
123
Id. at 405–06.
124
Id. at 409 (emphasis in original).
125
Id. at 405–06.
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For American colonialists, security in possessions was exclusive; but at
that time, the distinction between exclusion and trespass—defined by a
physical presence on, or in relation to, the property of another—was less
clear.126 The Supreme Court did not begin to tease out the distinction
between an incursion on the effect and the information that it generated
until Katz and its progeny;127 indeed, the clearest analysis was not
announced until 2014.128 The physicality of trespass at the time of the
Fourth Amendment’s passage was not the problematic distinction it is in
the modern context, since exclusion from an effect had no functional,
intangible application.129 Yet, just as the Boyd-Olmstead-Silverman line
increasingly demonstrated that a privacy right at the mercy of trespass is
vulnerable in the age of wired telecommunications, so too does the Jones
physicality requirement enfeeble privacy in the age of IoT.

C. Exclusion Promotes an Objective Expectation of Digital Privacy
Jones’ reliance on common law trespass is too restrictive to
appropriately protect privacy interests in a digital age.130 Cyberspace, of
course, is not a “space” in the physical sense; it is an electronic conduit
through which physical consequences may be generated.131 Likewise,
even the least intelligent, RFID-enabled smart object in the home offers “a
direct portal into the data it contains, a point of ‘entry’ [law enforcement]
can exploit without affecting any physical entry into Fourth Amendmentprotected premises.”132 Under Justice Scalia’s formulation, the Court “left
open whether virtual intrusions” of smart objects “will also constitute a
search.”133 The Court must correct its course, recognize the inapt nature of
126

See Clancy, supra note 44, at 356.
See Gatewood, supra note 59, at 457–58 (discussing the Court’s motivation
with Katz to address the distinction between physical and personal privacy).
128
See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 833 (commenting on the novel analytical move
in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), distinguishing “physical objects
from digital content (data) in those physical objects”).
129
See cf. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (cautioning the
Court against its reliance on trespass, as “ways may some day be developed by
which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, [exposing] the most intimate occurrences of the home”).
130
See infra section III.b (arguing that smart objects in the home are effects within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and constitutional protection for smart
effects extends to the data they generate, store, and communicate).
131
Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches
and the Use of Virtual Force, 81 MISS. L.J. 1229, 1230 (2012).
132
Id. at 1241–42.
133
Ferguson, supra note 15, at 810; see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414,
425–26 (2012) (Sotomayor and Alito, JJ., concurring) (agreeing that Jones’
reliance on common law trespass is too restrictive to appropriately protect digital
privacy interests).
127
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physical trespass for smart objects, and set an objective expectation of
privacy based on a right to exclude.
To be sure, the Jones Court punted on the broader discussion of
the constitutional propriety of invasive electronic surveillance, and it
failed to engage in any explanation of the character of the data gathered—
namely, whether it reveals enough about the “privacies of life” that
collection by law enforcement of such information would, in itself, trigger
the Fourth Amendment.134 In his concurrence, Justice Alito comes closest
to clarifying this more pertinent issue, which the majority opinion
dismisses as beyond the scope of the matter.135 Justice Alito rightly points
out that “reliance on the law of trespass will present particularly vexing
problems in cases involving surveillance . . . carried out by making
electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked.”136
Justice Sotomayor echoed Justice Alito’s concern, noting that “physical
intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.”137 She went
further, though, to question broader societal expectations of privacy,
ignored by the majority, that may be impacted by advancing technological
capabilities and electronic surveillance.138 Most conspicuously, though
outside the scope of this paper, she questioned the longevity in the digital
age of the Third Party Doctrine,139 which holds individuals have no
expectation of privacy regarding information disclosed to third parties,
notably, to service providers.140
Articulating a reasonable expectation of privacy grounded in the
right to exclude will bring into the sphere of the Fourth Amendment’s
protection smart devices that otherwise pose risks to the security of the
home and the effects it contains. In line with Justices Alito and
Sotomayor’s concerns, the right to exclude, rather than trespass, is better
suited to the non-physical technological capabilities of twenty-first
century surveillance. The two concepts, both grounded in common law
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 412 (acknowledging that these “vexing problems” may
need to be addressed in the future “where a classic trespassory search is not
involved”); see also Ferguson, supra note 15, at 810 (agreeing that the Court left
open the question of whether “virtual intrusions will also constitute a search”).
135
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 425–26 (Alito, J., concurring) (enumerating four broad
concerns left unanswered by the majority opinion).
136
Id. at 426.
137
Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
138
See id. at 416 (considering the “attributes of GPS monitoring” vis-à-vis societal
expectations).
139
Id. at 417 (“It may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties.”).
140
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976).
134
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property, are related but distinct, with trespass predicated on the broader
notion of exclusion.141 Unique among property rights at common law, the
right to exclude encompasses societal norms and expectations of privacy
as well as offers an objective “benchmark for determining the scope of
allowable intrusion into our daily lives.”142 Thus, exclusion preserves
personal autonomy and protects against arbitrary intrusions by the state.143
Jones did not reject Justice Harlan’s expectations of privacy. Per
the majority opinion, where no trespassory intrusion is executed by the
state, the Katz analysis controls.144 What is reasonable in the context of
IoT, however, is far from clear. The Court’s decision in Kyllo gives some
indication as to how a privacy right may be articulated with regards to
smart objects in the home; but there, too, questions remain.145 In contrast
to Jones, Kyllo did not involve a trespass.146 The thermal scan of the home
occurred from across the street and was purely electronic.147 In Kyllo, the
right to exclude was tacitly supported by the Court as a corollary to the
reasonable expectation of privacy.148 Importantly though, Kyllo also
stands for the notion that widely available technologies, or those in
common use, may diminish expectations of privacy.149 How this would
play out in the context of smart objects is unclear where it is broadly
understood that government agents, if not also black hat hackers, are able
to remotely access smart devices in the home.150
Correcting its misstep in Jones, however, would go a long way
towards correcting this uncertainty. In doing so, the Court should build on
its decision in Kyllo and affirmatively rely on the right to exclude, while
expressly recognizing the ubiquity of modern smart technology. Such a
holding will have the added benefit of articulating the method by which
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See Gatewood, supra note 59, at 454.
Id. at 464–65.
143
See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 862 (“Whether conceived of as a right to be
left alone, or a space for intimate activities, or other protections of personal
autonomy, the Fourth Amendment has been read to encourage human
development from governmental surveillance.”).
144
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411
145
See Gatewood, supra note 59, at 461.
146
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30 (2001) (noting the thermal scan
was conducted from across the street, outside the curtilage).
147
Id.
148
Gatewood, supra note 59, at 461 (noting the reasonable expectation of privacy
“preserv[ed] and protect[ed] the defendant’s right to exclude even without a
physical intrusion”).
149
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
150
See supra notes 35–37 (detailing the known hacking capabilities of state and
private actors to remotely access networked devices).
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the framers intended to secure privacy.151 Moreover, an exclusion
framework, which inherently incorporates notions of reasonable
expectations of privacy, would help to further assimilate digital privacy
security under Katz by presuming exclusion as objectively reasonable.152
This would help to focus the Kyllo analysis onto enhanced technologies,
rather than turning on common usage—a point Justice Scalia was
uncertain about in his Kyllo majority.153 Thus, the pathway to a digitalprivacy-protective Fourth Amendment in houses and effects would be
more secure through the explicit recognition of the right to exclude.

CONCLUSION
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is again at a junction where
relatively new, but pervasive, technologies demand a course-correction.
The business model of smart devices amounts to private surveillance, and
society has accepted this to the extent that it improves services through
interconnectivity.154 Yet, these devices have a range of intelligence, and
each smart object represents a vector for remote access by black hat
hackers and government agents alike.155 Without an affirmative
recognition by the Court that the data-rich smart home is secured by the
Fourth Amendment, privacy rights in the United States are vulnerable to
digital abuses by the state.
As the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests,
the privacy standard guaranteed by the Amendment must focus on
unlawful intrusion, not the mechanism by which the intrusion is or may be
perfected.156 The method of this protection has evolved from an in rem
focus on trespass, to the in personam reasonable expectation of privacy,
and back to a hybrid approach defined by the physicality of the intrusion.
The trespass approach re-instituted in Jones, however, fails to account for
the potentially remote nature of government incursions at issue with the
IoT and consequently, “is ill-suited to the digital age.”157 The Fourth
151

See Clancy, supra note 44, at 308 (linking security to the right to exclude as
the means of operationalizing privacy).
152
See Leonetti, supra note 119, at 21 (arguing that the serious harms inflicted by
high-tech invasions of privacy may best be corrected by a property-based doctrine
that “serve[s] as a unifying principle to rationalize and expand the Amendment’s
privacy protections,” like that provided by a reliance on exclusion).
153
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
154
Cf. Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things that Talk About You Behind Your
Back, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 8, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/
the-internet-of-things-that-talk-about-you-behind-your-back
(discussing
computerized devices and cyber security).
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Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 24, at 583–84.
156
See Slobogin, supra note 97, at 162.
157
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Amendment uses the language and concepts of property law to articulate
the scope of the right protected, and it secures that right to privacy through
exclusion from certain enumerated objects. The Court, therefore, must
reject the overly-narrow approach of Jones in favor of a right to exclude
that better accounts for the digital capabilities of twenty-first century
surveillance. Moreover, doing so will have the added benefit of bolstering
the reasonable expectation of digital privacy by presuming an objective
unreasonableness in any warrantless penetration by the state into the smart
home. Digital privacy is ripe for the Court’s attention, and the Court
should use this opportunity to “define anew . . . the extent of such
protection” guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment in the age of the IoT.158
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See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 193.

